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INTRODUCTION
Is medical marijuana legal? Is it the next gold rush or is it a
shiny nugget of "fool's gold"? Florida is the latest state to jump into the
arena of medical marijuana with the passage of SBI030 on June 16,
2014. The law, named The Compassionate Medical Cannabis Act of
2014,' allows low-THC cannabis to be prescribed to patients suffering
from cancer or physical medical conditions that chronically produce
symptoms of seizures or severe and persistent muscle spasms.2 The
low-THC strain was nicknamed "Charlotte's Web" after Charlotte Figi,
a then five-year-old girl suffering from pediatric epilepsy, noticed a
dramatic reduction in seizures after taking the drug.3 She has since
become the unofficial poster child of medical marijuana as states
across the country legalize the low-THC strain, using her story to vali-
date marijuana's place in the apothecary.
Though passed in a bipartisan fashion with widespread popular
support, SBI030 raises some troubling issues. Marijuana remains a
Schedule I drug.4 The allowance of only five dispensaries in the entire
1. FLA. STAT. § 381.986(1)-(7) (2014).
2. Tetrahydrocannibol, or "THC", is the psychoactive ingredient in marijuana. Aaron
Roussell, The Forensic Identification of Marijuana: Suspicion, Moral Danger, and the Crea-
tion of Non-Psychoactive THC, 22 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 103, 121 (2012). Low THC cannabis
is defined as "a plant of the genus Cannabis, the dried flowers of which contain 0.8 percent
or less of tetrahydrocannabinol and more than 10 percent of cannabidiol weight for weight;
the seeds thereof, the resin extracted from any part of such plant; or any compound, manu-
facture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of such plant or its seeds or resin that is
dispensed only from a dispensing organization." § 381.986(1)(b).
3. Saundra Young, Marijuana Stops Child's Severe Seizures, CNN, http://www.cnn
.com/2013/08/07/healthlcharlotte-child-medical-marijuanal (last updated Aug. 7, 2013).
4. See infra notes 10, 11 and accompanying text.
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state of Florida5 is forbidden by the Sherman Antitrust Act. 6 Addition-
ally, the Controlled Substances Act 7 preempts Florida's medical
marijuana legislation., As a result, legal businesses, sanctioned by the
state of Florida, may be subjected to criminal charges on the federal
level. Banks processing monies derived from an illegal enterprise may
be subject to federal racketeering charges. Businesses normally write
off their business expenses before paying taxes on realized profits. If
the IRS does not deem a marijuana dispensary a legal and legitimate
business, though licensed and sanctioned by the state, these busi-
nesses may be taxed out of existence.
These legal difficulties have been blunted to a degree by state-
ments from federal lawmakers that seemingly give the legal nod to
state-sanctioned marijuana businesses, but that may not be enough.
Without anything being codified at the federal level, these businesses
are essentially gambling with their future. They are subject, at any
point in time, to federal raids, property seizures, and even prison time,
as they are, in fact, operating an illegal business in the eyes of the
federal government. These risks are worth it to some due to the allure
of potentially fast and "high" profits. Whether or not this is a sustaina-
ble business model without changes on the federal level remains to be
seen. These issues and possible remedies will be addressed in the body
of this paper.
Part I of this article discusses the evolution of marijuana regu-
lation from strict prohibition sentiment leading to the passage of the
Controlled Substances Act, to a more lax, present-day sentiment.
States began passing medical marijuana laws as a result of this more
lax sentiment. Following the national trend, Florida passed its own
medical marijuana legislation, known as the Compassionate Medical
Cannabis Act of 2014.
Part II of the article addresses the first obstacle that Florida's
marijuana legislation will face: preemption under the Controlled Sub-
stances Act. The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that the Controlled
Substances Act expressly forbids any medical necessity exception for
marijuana.9 The Department of Justice and the Financial Crimes En-
forcement Network have indicated that they will not crack down on
5. § 381.986(5)(b).
6. 15 U.S.C. §8 1-7 (2012).
7. 21 U.S.C. § 802(7) (2012).
8. § 381.986(2).
9. U.S. v. Oakland Buyers' Coop., 532 U.S. 483 (2001).
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state-sanctioned medical businesses;10 however, this alone may not be
enough to protect medical marijuana businesses from federal scrutiny.
Part III examines the second obstacle for Florida's marijuana
legislation. The Sherman Antitrust Act expressly forbids any activity
that results in the creation of a monopoly. Florida's Compassionate
Medical Cannabis Act allows for the creation of only five dispensaries
to serve the entire state of Florida. In applying the California Retail
Liquor Dealers Association v. Midcal Aluminum" two-part test, Flor-
ida's legislation will not benefit from Parker v. Brown state immunity
from antitrust violations.'2 In addition, applying the United States. v.
E.I. Du Ponte Nemours & Co.'s test, individuals who open medical ma-
rijuana dispensaries under Florida's current legislation will be in
violation the Sherman Antitrust Act.'
3
Part IV proposes remedies that Congress and Florida may im-
plement to save Florida's medical marijuana legislation. First,
Congress may create a McCarran-Ferguson-like exemption, which
would remove state-sanctioned medical marijuana businesses from the
Controlled Substances Act's reach. Second, Congress may simply re-
classify or declassify marijuana under the Controlled Substances Act.
Finally, Florida must allow for competition in the medical marijuana
industry to prevent violating the Sherman Antitrust Act.
In sum, Florida's Compassionate Medical Cannabis Act is
flawed. Entrepreneurs flocking to Florida with hopes of making it big
may be stopped dead in their tracks. The federal government may, at
any time, crack down on these businesses for violating either the Con-
trolled Substances Act or the Sherman Antitrust Act. Changes need to
be made to current law in order for the Florida Compassionate Medical
Cannabis Act to stand.
I. EVOLUTION OF MARIJUANA REGULATION RESULTING IN FLORIDA'S
PASSAGE OF THE COMPASSIONATE MEDICAL CANNABIS ACT
Marijuana has been used throughout history to manage all
kinds of ailments.'4 However, starting in the early 1900s, prohibition-
10. See infra Part II, section B.
11. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
12. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
13. 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
14. Medicinal use of medical marijuana existed as far back as the Chinese Emperor
Chen Hung Dynasty over 500 years ago. Marijuana was recommended for conditions such
as malaria, constipation, rheumatic pain, absentmindedness, and female disorders. Lester
Grinspoon, History of Cannabis as a Medicine, MULTIDISCIPLINARY Ass'N FOR PSYCHEDELIC
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ist sentiment15 arose in America with Harry Jacob Anslinger, the
commissioner for the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, leading the charge
with claims that Marijuana causes "insanity... [and] pushe[s] people
toward horrendous acts of criminality.'1 6 By the mid-1930s, with the
advent of drugs such as aspirin and opium derivatives, which had simi-
lar medicinal effects as marijuana, nearly all states enacted some form
of regulation limiting the use of marijuana.
17
A. Marijuana Prohibition Under the Controlled Substances Act
In 1970, Congress, using the authority given to them under the
Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution,' enacted the Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act of 1970.19 The Controlled Substances Act
("CSA") was enacted as part of the Act. According to the CSA, a "con-
trolled substance" is any "drug or other substance, immediate or
precursor, included in schedule I, II, III, IV, or V. . . *"20 Schedule I of
the CSA includes any "drug or other substance [with] a high potential
for abuse" and "has no currently accepted medical use ... in the United
States."'2 1 Marijuana was placed on Schedule 1.22 Government-ap-
proved research projects were the "only one express exception to the
prohibitions on manufacturing and distributing'23 of drugs listed on
Schedule I. The Attorney General is authorized by federal statute to
"remove any drug or other substance from the schedule if he finds that
the drug or other substance does not meet the requirements for inclu-
sion in any schedule.'24 The Attorney General has delegated this
STUD. (Aug. 16, 2005), available at http://www.maps.org/mmj/grinspoon history cannabis
medicine.pdf.
15. Dale H. Gieringer, The Origins of Cannabis Prohibition in California, CALIFOR-
NIA NORML (June 2006), available at www.canorml.org/background/caloriginsmjproh.pdf.
16. Brent Staples, The Federal Marijuana Ban is Rooted in Myth and Xenophobia,
N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014107/30/opinion/high-time-federal-
marijuana-ban-is-rooted-in-myth.html? r=l.
17. MARK EDDY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33211, MEDICAL MARIJUANA: REVIEW AND
ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL AND STATE POLICIES (2009), available at www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/
RL33211.pdf.
18. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
19. Drug Enforcement Admin., 1970-1975, DEPT. OF JUSTICE, www.justice.gov/dea/
about/history/1970-1975.pdf (last visited June 14, 2015).
20. 21 U.S.C. § 802(7) (2012).
21. The Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 812(b) (1970) (listing each schedule and
its definition).
22. Id. § 812(b)(c)(10).
23. U.S. v. Oakland Buyers' Coop., 532 U.S. 483 (2001).
24. 21 U.S.C. § 811(a)(2).
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authority to the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administra-
tion ("DEA").
25
In an opinion by Administrative Law Judge Francis L. Young,
dated September 6, 1988, she recommended, in relevant part,
that the Administrator conclude that the marijuana plant consid-
ered as a whole has a currently accepted medical use in treatment
in the United States, that there is no lack of accepted safety for use
of it under medical supervision and that it may lawfully be trans-
ferred from Schedule I to Schedule II. The judge recommends that
the Administrator transfer marijuana from Schedule I to Schedule
11.26
The Administrator refused to follow the Administrative Law Judge's
recommendation and declined to move Marijuana from Schedule I to
Schedule JJ27 Unlike Schedule I drugs, all other Schedules "have cur-
rently accepted medical use.' 28 This would allow state-sanctioned
medical marijuana businesses to legally exist under federal regulation.
The Administrator's decision was affirmed by the D.C. District Court of
Appeals in 1994.29
B. A Change of the Tide: National Trend Toward
Marijuana Legalization
In the 1970's, there was "a growing recognition among health
care professionals and the public that marijuana had therapeutic ef-
fect."30 Doctors found that smoking marijuana helped patients
undergoing chemotherapy with nausea,31 reduced spasticity in pa-
25. 28 C.F.R. § 0.100(b).
26. Marijuana Rescheduling Petition, Docket No. 86-22, 68 (Drug Enforcement Agency
Sept. 6, 1988) (Op. and Recommended Rulings, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Decision of A.L.J. Francis L. Young), available at http://www.druglibrary.org/Schaffer/li
brary/studies/YOUNG/index.html [hereinafter A.L.J. Op.].
27. See Alliance for Cannabis Therapeutics v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 15 F.3d 1131,
1137 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (stating that "our review of the record convinces us that the Admin-
istrator's findings are supported by substantial evidence ... The Final Order canvasses the
record at length. It recites testimony of numerous experts that marijuana's medicinal value
has never been proven in sound scientific studies.").
28. 21 U.S.C. § 812(b).
29. See Alliance for Cannabis Therapeutics, 15 F.3d at 1131.
30. A.L.J. Op., supra note 26.
31. See id. at 11-12. Chemotherapy treatments involve "the use of highly toxic chemi-
cals." This results in severe nausea and decreased appetite. Although there are synthetic
forms of THC capsules on the market, natural marijuana is better because it is inhaled
instead of ingested, achieving faster results. Id.
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tients with multiple sclerosis,32 managed pain associated with pseudo
hypoparathyroidism,33 and reduced spasms associated with quad-
raplegia.34 Subsequently, many states began to formally acknowledge
that marijuana plays an important role in cases where traditional
therapies have failed. As of this writing, "[t]wenty-three states and the
District of Columbia have remov[ed] criminal sanctions for the medical
use of marijuana.'35 To illustrate the emerging national trends in ma-
rijuana policy, Colorado and Washington have both approved
measures which go as far as allowing any adult over the age of 21 to
possess up to one ounce of marijuana for recreational use.
36
C. Florida's Passage of the Compassionate Medical
Cannabis Act of 2014
Florida, as recently as 2010, was known as the "Pill Mill" capi-
tol of the country.37 Patients from out-of-state could come into Florida,
doctor shop, and obtain ostensibly an endless supply of pain pills.
Given this recent, dubious past, and the high risk for marijuana addic-
tion and abuse, the legislature was extremely careful in the wording of
SB1030.
Several state regulators publicly announced that they passed
the Act to "ensure that children of Florida who suffer from seizures and
other debilitating illnesses will have medication needed to improve
their quality of life." 38 Many regulators, however, feared that passing
32. See id. at 40 (defining spasticity as "an involuntary and abnormal contraction of
muscle or muscle fibers").
33. Id. at 47.
34. See id. at 49 (finding that there was not sufficient evidence to show that marijuana
helped reduce the intraocular pressure for a glaucoma patient).
35. The Twenty-Three States and One Federal District with Effective Medical Mari-
juana Laws, MARIJUANA POL'Y PROJECT (July 25, 2014), http://www.mpp.org/assets/pdfs/
library/MMJLawsSummary.pdf.
36. Id. at 5, 23.
37. See Governor Scott: Florida No Longer Pill Mill Haven, CBS MIAMI (Mar. 14, 2012),
http://miami.cbslocal.com/2012/03/14/gov-scott-florida-no-longer-pill-mill-haven/; see also
Elaine Silvestri, Florida Heals from Pill Mill Epidemic, TAMPA TRIBUNE (Aug. 30, 2014),
http://tbo.conmnews/crime/florida-heals-from-pill-mill-epidemic-20140830/. In 2010, over
1,500 patients died from Oxycodone overdose. The Legislators feared that increasing regula-
tion would result in more cost to the state and potentially invade the patient's privacy.
Despite these fears, however, the state and federal government, along with the drug compa-
nies, have made changes that resulted in a dramatic reduction in deaths related to
Oxycodone overdoses and the existence of pill mills within Florida.
38. Nicole Flatow, Almost Every Lawmaker in Florida Supports Medical Marijuana
Bill, Even Rick Scott, THINK PROGRESS (May 2, 2014), http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2014/
05/02/3433610/almost-every-lawmaker-in-florida-supports-medical-marijuana-bill-even-
rick-scott/.
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medical marijuana would result in the "Coloradification" of Florida.
3 9
The Florida legislature has a substantial interest in protecting its citi-
zens from injury as a result of criminal acts relating to marijuana use,
distribution, and diversion. This sentiment was expressed by various
Senators, including Senator Daryl Rouson, who stated that passing
this legislation may lead to "cracking the door open" and "sending the
message that it is okay to use marijuana.' 40 In response to Senator
Rouson's concerns, Senator Gaetz, one of the promoters of the bill,
stated that the legislation would only legalize low-THC cannabis for
medical use and would not allow for the administration of the cannabis
by inhalation.4 1 Senator Gaetz also intimated that the reason for the
strict legislation is to prevent what happened in other states that have
previously enacted legislation legalizing medical marijuana.42 He
stated that the problem is "most other states that have legalized any
form of cannabis have been rifled with abuse, recreational use, [and]




40. H.R. 843, 86th Fla. House, 116th Sess., (May 1, 2014), available at http://
www.myfloridahouse.gov/Sections/HouseCalendar/broadcast.aspx [hereinafter "House
Debate"].
41. Id. According to Senator Gaetz, administration of medication has never been inter-
preted to mean inhalation; see also House Message Summary, The Florida Senate, 1 (May 2,
2014), available at http://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2014/1030/Analyses/2014s1030.hms
.PDF (defining "low-THC cannabis to mean a plant of the genus Cannabis, the dried flowers
of which contain 0.8 percent or less of tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) and more than 10 per-
cent of Cannabidiol (CBD) weight for weight"); FLA. STAT. § 381.986(1) (2014); Sandra
Young, Marijuana Stops Child's Seizures, CNN (Aug. 7, 2013), http://www.cnn.conm2013/08/
07/health/charlotte-child-medical-marijuana/ (reporting on Charlotte Fiji, the daughter of
Matt and Paige Fiji, who suffered from a rare condition, known as Dravet Syndrome, which
causes severe intractable epilepsy. She has undergone all forms of conventional therapy to
no avail. As a last resort, the Fijis were able to obtain the signature of two physicians in
order for Charlotte to try medical marijuana. Paige Fiji was able to purchase some mari-
juana, known as R4, which was high in CBD but low in THC. The oil extract from the plant
has been a life changer for Charlotte. The R4 is now known as Charlotte's Web, named after
Charlotte Fiji.).
42. House Debate, supra note 40.
43. Id.
44. Bill Signing Makes Florida 22nd State to Pass Medical Marijuana Legislation,
SUNSHINE STATE NEWS (June 16, 2014), http://www.sunshinestatenews.com/story/bill-sign-
ing-makes-florida-22nd-state-pass-medical-marijuana-legislation (referencing, Kate
Edwards, a bill co-sponsor in the Florida House of Representatives, stated that by passing
the bill, "Florida has the opportunity to lead in the research and evelopment of scientific
breakthroughs from cannabis-derived therapies."); see also Bill Cotterell, Rick Scott Signs
Law Allowing Limited Medical Marijuana Use in Florida, HUFFINGTON POST (June 16,
2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/06/16/florida-medical-marijuana n 5500496
.html; House Debate, supra note 40 (quoting a statement by Senator Matt Gaetz: "there are
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On June 16, 2014, Florida's Governor, Rick Scott, signed into
law The Compassionate Medical Cannabis Act of 2014.45 Under the
Act, a physician may order low-THC cannabis for patients under their
care who are "suffering from cancer or a physical medical condition
that chronically produces symptoms of seizures or severe or persistent
muscle spasms.'46 Patients who qualify for the low-THC cannabis
must register with the state and obtain the medication from one of the
five state-approved dispensing organizations.47 Physicians, qualified
patients, and dispensing centers and its employees will all be exempt
from criminal penalties under the medical necessity defense.48 Despite
being exempt from criminal penalties under Florida's laws, these indi-
viduals may still be held criminally liable under the Controlled
Substances Act. Furthermore, the dispensing organizations may be li-
able under the Sherman Antitrust Act for engaging in monopolistic
activities.
11. THE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT PREEMPTS STATES'
MEDICAL MARIJUANA LEGISLATION
A. The U.S. Supreme Court Rules that the Controlled Substance Act
Preempts State Marijuana Legislation
All state-sanctioned medical marijuana businesses are illegal
businesses in the eyes of the U.S. Supreme Court.49 The CSA preempts
any state medical marijuana legislation.50 According to the Court, the
Act does not allow for any medical necessity exception.5 1 Therefore,
states cannot legally create any legislation allowing for medical mari-
juana use or dispensing. The Internal Revenue Service agrees with the
U.S. Supreme Court hat these state sanctioned businesses are ille-
gal.5 2 However, the U.S. President, the Financial Enforcement
children who are racing to their deaths and I just can't balance the impact of their life
against that argument because we are being as cautious as we can.").
45. Florida Became 24th State/District to Legalize IDecriminalized Medical Marijuana
Today, FLA. MARIJUANA INFO (June 16, 2014), http://floridamarijuanainfo.org/law-featured/
florida-became-23nd-state-to-legalize-medical-marijuana-today/.
46. FLA. STAT. § 381.986(2) (2014).
47. See id. § 381.986(5).
48. See id. § 381.986(7).
49. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop, 532 U.S. at 483.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 491.
52. See generally 28 U.S.C.A. § 280E (2014).
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Network, and the U.S. Attorney General have promised to treat such
businesses as legal enterprises.5
3
Preemption may be either express or implied.5 4 Express pre-
emption exists where "Congress' command is explicitly stated in the
statute's language."55 There are two types of implied preemption: field
preemption and conflict preemption.5 6 Field preemption exists "where
the scheme of the federal regulation 'is so pervasive as to make reason-
able inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement
it."' 7 Whereas conflict preemption exists where "compliance with both
federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility,"58 or where
the state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execu-
tion of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.'" 9 The U.S.
Supreme Court, in United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyer's Coop.,
has ruled that the CSA expressly preempts any state medical mari-
juana legislation.60 Specifically, the Court stated, "The Controlled
Substances Act provides that '[e]xcept as authorized by this sub-
chapter, it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally
... to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to
manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance."'61 The
sole exception in the Act, which pertains to "Government-approved re-
search projects," is provided in Section 823(f) of the CSA.62 The Court
refused to recognize the "medical necessity" exception defense for mari-
juana use under the Act, noting that "[t]he statute . . . does not
explicitly abrogate the defense . . . [b]ut its provisions leave no doubt
that the defense is unavailable.
' 63
Consistent with the Court's conclusion that the CSA preempts
all state enacted medical marijuana laws, the United States Tax
Courts have ruled that the Internal Revenue Service's enforcement of
Section 280E is valid.64 Section 280E states in relevant part:
53. See infra Part II, section B.
54. Gade v. Nat'l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
58. Id. (quoting Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43
(1963)).
59. Id. (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
60. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop, 532 U.S. at 483.
61. Id. at 489 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2010)).
62. 21 U.S.C. § 823(f) (2009).
63. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 523 U.S. at 491.
64. See Californians Helping to Alleviate Med. Problems, Inc. v. Comm'r of Internal
Revenue, 128 T.C. 173, 184-85 (2007) (holding that the petitioner's business consisted
mainly of legal activities "unrelated to petitioner's provision of medical marijuana." There-
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No deduction or credit shall be allowed for any amount paid or in-
curred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business
if such trade or business (or the activities which comprise such
trade or business) consists of trafficking in controlled substances
(within the meaning of schedule I and II of the Controlled Sub-
stances Act).
65
Congress passed this section in direct response to "the outcome of a
case in which this Court allowed a taxpayer to deduct expenses in-
curred in an illegal drug trade."
66
B. U.S. Attorney General Vows to Turn Blind Eye
to State Marijuana Businesses
Despite the Court's ruling, Attorney General Eric Holder for-
mally announced that "[t] he guidelines make clear that the focus of the
federal resources hould not be on individuals whose actions are in
compliance with existing state laws .... It will not be a priority to use
federal resources to prosecute patients with serious illnesses . . . who
fore, petitioner was allowed to deduct all expenses relating to petitioner's care giving
business. The Court based its decision in part on Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467,
474 (1943), wherein this Court noted, "[i]t has never been thought ... that the mere fact
that an expenditure bears a remote relation to an illegal act makes it non-deductible."); see
also Olive v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 139 T.C. 19, 37-39 (2012) (distinguishing Califor-
nians Helping to Alleviate Med. Problems by stating "[w]e ... reject petitioner's contention
that section 280E does not apply because the Vapor Room was a legitimate operation under
California law .... The taxpayer in CHAMP was a legitimate (under State law) operation
that had a second business (providing caregiving services) and we applied section 280E
there." The Court also stated that "[t]he dispensing of medical marijuana, while legal in
California (among other States), is illegal under Federal law."); Jolie Lee, Medical Mari-
juana Stores Blocked from Tax Breaks, USA TODAY (Mar. 17, 2014), http://
www.usatoday.conmVstory/news/nation-now/2014/03/17/marijuana-tax-breaks-irs/6367 137
("Because of 280E, the effective tax rate for marijuana businesses is 50% or more .... ");
Peter Hecht, Medical Marijuana Dispensary Takes on IRS over What it Calls 'Punitive'
Taxes, WASH. POST (Feb. 23, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/medical-mari
juana-dispensary-takes-on-irs-over-what-it-calls-punitive-taxes/2014102/23/25fa6458-9cd3-
11e3-ad71-e03637a299c0 story.html (referencing Canna Care dispensary's argument that
the Internal Revenue Service's enforcement of Section 280E "violates the 14th Amend-
ment's equal protection clause. The petition [by Canna Care] argued that the IRS was
'tacitly' working to enforce U.S. drug laws against the dispensary even as it allowed Canna
Care to deduct its costs of goods, the marijuana.").
65. 28 U.S.C.A. § 280E.
66. Californians Helping to Alleviate Med. Problems, Inc., 128 T.C. at 181-82 (referenc-
ing S. REP. No. 97-494 (Vol. 1), at 309 (1982)) (stating that Congress' decision was based "on
public policy grounds ... [and] to make certain otherwise ordinary and necessary expenses
incurred in [an illegal] trade or business nondeductible."); see also Edmondson v. Comm'r,
42 T.C.M. (CCH) 1533 (1981) (finding that the taxpayer "was self-employed in a trade or
business of selling amphetamines, cocaine, and marijuana." The Court allowed the taxpayer
to deduct his business expenses because they "were made in connection with ... [the tax-
payer's] trade or business and were both ordinary and necessary.").
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are complying with state laws on medical marijuana, but we will not
tolerate drug traffickers.' 67 Deputy Attorney General James M. Cole
reiterated Mr. Holder's sentiment in a memorandum written on Au-
gust 29, 2013, stating that the purpose of the memorandum was to
provide further guidance "in light of state ballot initiatives that legal-
ize under state law the possession of small amounts of marijuana and
provide for the regulation of marijuana production, processing, and
sale."68 Mr. Cole listed eight priorities of the Department of Justice
relating to enforcement of marijuana related conduct. These priorities
include various activities such as distributing marijuana to minors, di-
version of marijuana, and criminal enterprises relating to marijuana
distribution, amongst other activities.6 9 He stressed that, other than
the priorities listed in the memorandum, "the federal government [will
rely] on states and local law enforcement agencies to address mari-
juana activity .... ,70
Even with the assurances of both Mr. Holder and Mr. Cole,
most banks have refused to deal with such businesses for fear of being
at risk of prosecution under federal "drug racketeering charges."'7 1 In
order to allay some of these fears, the Financial Crimes Enforcement
Network (FinCEN) issued guidance for banks to follow. 72 The guidance
outlined seven factors for financial institutions to use "in assessing the
67. Attorney General Announces Formal Medical Marijuana Guidelines, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE (Oct. 19, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/October/09-ag-1119.html; see
also Tierney Sneed, Eric Holder's Unfinished Business, U.S. NEWS (Oct. 3, 2014), http://
www.usnews.com/news/articles/2014/10/03/for-eric-holders-supporters-the-attorney-general
-still-has-work-to-do ("In an interview before news of his resignation broke, Holder sug-
gested he was open to the idea of rescheduling marijuana - meaning reclassifying it as a
drug less dangerous than heroin or LSD, for example, and thus easing some of the federal
regulations regarding its production and trafficking."). But see Sacramento Nonprofit Col-
lective v. Holder, 855 F. Supp. 2d 1100, 1111 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (concluding "[a] reasonable
person, having read the entirety of the Ogden Memo, could not conclude that the federal
government was somehow authorizing the production and consumption of marijuana for
medical purposes. Any suggestion to the contrary defies the plain language of the Memo.")
(referencing Mont. Caregivers Ass'n v. United States, 841 F. Supp. 2d 1148, 1149 (D. Mont.
2012)).
68. Memorandum from the Deputy Att'y Gen James M. Cole to all U.S. Att'ys, Gui-
dance Regarding Marijuana Enforcement 1 (Aug. 29, 2013), available at http://www.
justice.gov/iso/opalresources/30520 13829 132756857467.pdf.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 2.
71. Pete Yost, Feds Let Banks and Marijuana Sellers Do Business, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(Feb. 14, 2014), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/govt-issues-roadmap-banks-marijuana-
business.
72. BSA Expectations Regarding Marijuana-Related Businesses, DEP'T OF TREASURY
CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK 1 (Feb. 14, 2014), http://www.fincen.gov/statutes regs/gui
dance/pdf/FIN-2014-G001.pdf.
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risk of providing services to a marijuana-related business . . . . 3 Fin-
CEN encouraged the financial institutions to "consider whether a
marijuana-related business implicates any of the Cole Memo priorities
or violates state law."7 4 Financial institutions were directed to file a
Suspicious Activity Report if:
the financial institution knows, suspects, or has reason to suspect
that a transaction conducted or attempted by, at, or through the
financial institution: (i) involves funds derived from illegal activity
or is an attempt to disguise funds derived from illegal activity; (ii) is
designed to evade regulations promulgated under the BSA, or (iii)
lacks a business or apparent lawful purpose.
7 5
The signals coming out of Washington regarding medical mari-
juana have been mixed. Despite these conflicting decisions and actions
by the federal government, states continue to pass medical marijuana
laws. Florida, like many other states, continues to classify marijuana
as a Schedule I drug,7 6 consistent with the classification as set out
under the CSA. However, Section 381.986 of the Florida Statutes,
along with several other Florida court cases77 have recognized the
medical marijuana defense.
III. APPLICABILITY OF THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT
One of the factors that differ among state laws is the source
from which qualified patients may obtain their marijuana supply.
These sources range from patient home-grown, state-approved non-
profit dispensaries, and state-approved for-profit dispensaries to un-
named sources.78 Unlike other states, Florida has settled on the state
approved for-profit dispensary model. Section 381.986(5)(b) of the Flor-
ida Statutes imposes on the Department of Health the duty to
73. Id. at 3.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. FLA. STAT. § 893.03(1)(c) (2014).
77. Jenks v. State, 582 So. 2d 676, 678 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (creating the test for
medical necessity: "[t]he pressure of natural physical forces sometimes confronts a person in
an emergency with a choice of two evils: either he may violate the literal terms of the crimi-
nal law and thus produce a harmful result, or he may comply with those terms and thus
produce a greater or equal or lesser amount of harm. For reasons of social policy, if the harm
which will result from compliance with the law is greater than that which will result from
violation of it, he is by virtue of the defense of necessity justified in violating it."); see also
Sowell v. State, 738 So. 2d 333 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (agreeing with Jenks' medical
necessity ruling).
78. Bill Analysis and Fiscal Impact Statement, FLA. SENATE (Apr. 24, 2014), http://
www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2014/1030/Analyses/2014s 030.ap.PDF.
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"[a]uthorize the establishment of five dispensing organizations" by
January 1, 2015. These dispensing organizations are to cultivate, man-
ufacture, and dispense the low-THC marijuana directly to
the patient.7 9 Given that the state plans to license only five dispensa-
ries and these dispensaries are for-profit, Florida has created five
state-sanctioned monopolies.
The Sherman Antitrust Act was passed "in 1890 to combat an-
ticompetitive practices, reduce market domination by individual
corporations, and preserve unfettered competition."' 0 Congress passed
two additional anti-trust laws in 1914- the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act, which created the FTC, and the Clayton Act-which governs
"4specific practices that the Sherman Act does not clearly prohibit."''
The purpose of passing antitrust provisions was primarily for the "pro-
tection of competition.' ' 2 "The statute does not confine its protection to
consumers, or to purchasers, or to competitors, or to sellers . . . [T]he
Act is comprehensive in its terms and coverage, protecting all who are
made victims of the forbidden practices by whomever they may be
"83
The first section of the Act prohibits "[e]very contract, combina-
tion in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce ... .",,4 Section two of the Act prohibits actions of
"[e]very person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize
any part of the trade or commerce ..... ,5 Section 7 of the Sherman Act
states, "[t]he word "person," or "persons," wherever used . . . shall be
deemed to include corporations and associations existing under or au-
thorized by the laws . . . of any State ....
Senator George Hoar of Massachusetts, one of the authors of
the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, defined monopoly as "the sole en-
grossing to a man's self by means which prevent other men from
79. FLA. STAT. §§ 381.986(5)-(6) (2014).
80. Antitrust, CORNELL L. SCH. LEGAL INFO. INST., http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/anti
trust (last visited May 20, 2015).
81. The Antitrust Laws, FED. TRADE COMM'N, http://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competi
tion-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws (last visited June 14, 2015) (stating that
the Clayton Act prohibits actions such as "mergers and interlocking directorates" (that is,
the same person making business decisions for competing companies)).
82. Brown Shoe Co. v. U.S., 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962).
83. Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 68 S. Ct. 996, 1006 (1948).
84. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1890).
85. See id. § 2.
86. See id. § 7.
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engaging in fair competition with him. 17 He went on to say that "[o]f
course a monopoly granted by the King was a direct inhibition of all
other persons to engage in that business ... [this man] had a monopoly
granted to him by the sovereign power."88 However, "a man who
merely by superior skill and intelligence . . . got the whole business
because nobody could do it as well as he could was not a monopolist
"89
The Florida Antitrust Act of 1980 has language that mirrors
sections one and two of the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890.90 Section
542.32, Florida Statutes, states, "[i]t is the intent of the Legislature
that, in construing this chapter, due consideration and great weight be
given to the interpretations of the federal courts relating to comparable
federal antitrust statutes."91
The Court in Parker v. Brown has ruled that states are immune
from the effects of the Sherman Antitrust Act.9 2 However, state immu-
nity is not absolute.9 3 It is subject to the two-prong test as stated in
California Retail Liquor Dealers Association v. Midcal Aluminum.
9 4
But even if the state's legislation benefits from the Parker immunity,
individuals will still be held to have violated the Sherman Antitrust
Act if they engage in monopolistic business practices.
A. Florida's Five Dispensary Limitation Does Not Qualify for
Parker v. Brown State Immunity
The U.S. Supreme Court has long recognized that "[i]n a dual
system of government in which, under the Constitution, the states are
sovereign, save only as Congress may constitutionally subtract from
their authority, an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's control over
87. JAMES ARTHUR FINCH, BILLS AND DEBATES IN CONGRESS RELATING TO TRUSTS, 50th-





90. "Every contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce in
this state is unlawful." FLA. STAT. § 542.18 (2014).
91. See id. § 542.32 (2014); see also COMM'N ON BANKING & INS., APPLYING THE FLA.
ANTITRUST ACT TO THE BUS. OF INS., INTERIM S. REP. No. 2009-104, at 1 (2008), available at
http://archive.flsenate.gov/data/Publications/2009/Senate/reports/interim reports/pdf/2009-
104bi.pdf.
92. 317 U.S. at 351-52.
93. Id.
94. 445 U.S. at 105 (1980).
\ \jciprod01 \productn\ F\ FAM \10-1 \FAM105.txt unknown Seq: 16 17-DEC-15 12:55
124 FLORIDA A&M UNIV LAW REVIEW Vol. 10:1:109
its officers and agents is not lightly to be attributed to Congress."95 The
state legislature may use its authority to enact statutes and prescribe
conditions for its application.96 In Florida, the state legislature has de-
cided that it will allow for the cultivation, production, and distribution
of low-THC cannabis by "five dispensing organizations.'97 The legisla-
ture has also imposed various conditions for qualifying to be a
"dispensing organization," including "[t]he technical and technological
ability to cultivate and produce low-THC cannabis[,] a valid certifica-
tion of registration issued by the Department of Agriculture and
Consumer Services ... for the cultivation of more than 400,000 plants
... and [must] have been operated as a registered nursery in this state
for at least 30 continuous years."98 The dispensing organizations must
also provide sufficient security to the dispensing centers and have the
ability to conduct sufficient background checks on employees.99 Fi-
nally, both prescribing physicians and qualified patients are required
to register with a state-wide registry.100
At first blush, the Florida statute, allowing for only five re-
gional dispensaries, seems to violate both federal and Florida
antitrust laws because it allows for the creation of regional monopo-
lies. However, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized "state
immunity" as it applies to the Sherman Antitrust Act. 10 The Court
reasoned that the Sherman Antitrust Act did not specifically men-
tion any intent to restrain state action or official action directed by
the state, therefore, the Act is applicable only to "persons including
corporations.'0 2 The Court stated that [a] state statute, when con-
sidered in the abstract, may be condemned under antitrust laws
only if it mandates or authorizes conduct that necessarily consti-
tutes a violation of those laws in all cases, or it places irresistible
pressure on a private party to violate the antitrust laws in order to
comply with the statute.10 3
Sections 385.212(1) and (2) of the Florida Statutes impose a
duty on the Department of Health to establish an Office of Compas-
sionate Use. The purpose of creating this Office is to "enhance access to
investigational new drugs for Florida patients through approved
95. Parker, 317 U.S. at 350.
96. Id.
97. FLA. STAT. § 381.986(5)(b) (2014).
98. See id. § 381.986(5)(b)(1).
99. Id.
100. See id. § 381.986(5)(b).
101. Parker, 317 U.S. at 350.
102. Id. at 351.
103. Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 661 (1982) [Emphasis added].
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clinical treatment plans or studies."'01 4 Qualified patients may obtain
medical marijuana through these treatment centers. This creates an
alternative avenue for the distribution of medical marijuana and may
serve to alleviate the risk of regional monopolies. According to the
Court, if there is no antitrust violation in all situations, the law would
not be invalid.'05 But even if the statute is not invalid dispensing or-
ganization's "invocation of the ... statute ... [may still] be subject in
all cases to a per se rule of illegality under the Sherman Act."'
0 6
The Court, in California Retail Liquor Dealers,07 created a
two-prong test in determining whether a state statute is eligible for
antitrust immunity as stated in Parker.'0 "First, the challenged re-
straint must be 'one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as
state policy'; second, the policy must be 'actively supervised' by the
State itself."'0 9 As a matter of public policy, the second prong was prob-
ably added by the Court to prevent the creation of "natural
monopolies," which "are common in markets for 'essential services'
that require an expensive infrastructure to deliver the good or service,
such as the case of water supply, electricity, and gas, and other indus-
tries .... ,""o If left unchecked, these businesses have a potential for
making large profits while becoming very inefficient."'
In order to analyze the first prong of the California Retail Li-
quor Dealers case, one must first look at Florida's recent history.
Allowing only five dispensing organizations in the State of Florida was
part of a comprehensive plan by the state legislature to balance the
need for medical marijuana with the need to keep Floridians safe by
not allowing for another "Pill Mill" scenario."2 Although not specifi-
cally stated, another reason for the limitation could include the fact
that larger numbers of dispensing centers would result in higher costs
due to increased "workload associated with the enforcement and regu-
lation,' 1" 3 which would ultimately lead to higher regulatory costs.
104. FLA. STAT. § 385.212(2) (2014).
105. Rice, 458 U.S. at 661.
106. Id.
107. 445 U.S. at 105.
108. 317 U.S. at 350-51.
109. California Retail Liquor Dealers Assoc., 445 U.S. at 105 (citing City of Lafayette v.
L.A. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 410 (1978)).
110. Natural Monopolies, ECONOMICS ONLINE, http://www.economicsonline.co.uk/Busi
ness economics/Natural monopolies.html (last visited June 14, 2015).
111. Id.
112. Flatow, supra note 38.
113. FLA. SENATE, BILL ANALYSIS AND FISCAL IMPACT STATEMENT, S. 114, 1st Sess., at 9
(Apr. 24, 2014), available at http://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2014/1030/Analyses/2014s
1030.ap.PDF.
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Analysis of the statute itself, Florida history, Florida Senate and
House debate, and various other publications posted by numerous
Florida governmental agencies reveals that the public policy in re-
stricting the amount of dispensing organizations to five was to protect
against marijuana abuse.
114
The second prong of the test, as set out in California Retail Li-
quor Dealers, requires the state to "actively supervise" the industry.115
Florida law not only provides patients with the ability to legally obtain
marijuana, physicians with the ability to prescribe marijuana, and for
a place for patients to safely and legally obtain marijuana for medical
purposes, but it also sets strict guidelines for when a patient will be
eligible to obtain the medical marijuana, the annual continuing educa-
tion requirements for prescribing physicians, and orders the
Department of Health to set up a patient registry and establish guide-
lines for the creation of five dispensing organizations by January 1,
2015.116
The Florida Department of Health has released some very ex-
tensive proposed rules concerning the qualifications needed in order to
be eligible to obtain a dispensing center license, including the initial
application fee, the renewal fee per biennium, sanitation protocols, em-
ployee background checks, and the extensive Department of Health
monitoring of patients, physicians, and dispensing centers.117 There
are also very strict regulations as to how Schedule I and Schedule II
drugs are to be prescribed and dispensed.""
The extensive, detailed regulation is proof that the state in-
tends to stay actively involved in the cultivation, manufacturing,
prescribing, and dispensing of medical marijuana. Despite the compre-
hensive regulation, the second prong of the test has not been met as
the state fails to take an active role in regulating the pricing of medical
marijuana by the dispensaries.
According to the Kaiser foundation, "for patients who use mari-
juana to help alleviate chronic pain and nausea and stimulate appetite,
legalization is only part of the battle. Health insurance rarely, if ever,
covers its use; some patients spend hundreds of dollars a month or
114. See generally § 381.986; House Debate, supra note 40.
115. California Retail Liquor Dealers Assoc., 445 U.S. at 105 (citing City of Lafayette v.
L.A. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 410 (1978)).
116. See FLA. STAT. § 381.986 (2014).
117. 40 Fla. Admin. Weekly 3860-65 (Sep. 9, 2014), available at https://www.flrules.org/
Faw/FAWDocuments/FAWVOLUMEFOLDERS2014140175/40175doc.pdf.
118. FLA. STAT. §§ 893.04(1)(f), 893.04(2)(b) (2014).
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more on the drug."119 Florida law is silent on whether these dispensing
centers are to be for profit or non-profit.120 Florida legislators, in creat-
ing The Compassionate Medical Cannabis Act of 2014, failed to make
any mention of the cost of medical marijuana to the end user. The De-
partment of Health has also failed to make any mention of any
regulation to actively monitor retail prices. As a result, dispensing or-
ganizations will be free to charge whatever price they wish. The
Florida legislation fails the second prong test as noted in California
Retail Liquor Dealers since it
plays no role whatever in setting the retail prices. The prices are
established by producers according to their own economic interests,
without regard to any actual or potential anti-competitive effect
.... There is no control, or "pointed re-examination," by the state to
insure that the policies of the Sherman Act are not 'unnecessarily
subordinated' to state policy.'
2'
Florida stands to profit immensely from the sales tax revenue gener-
ated by marijuana sales, particularly if retail prices are kept high.
22
Also, given the high costs of entry into the business, coupled with a
relatively small amount of "qualified patients," dispensing organiza-
tions and their investors are going to be highly motivated to keep
prices elevated. This might lead one to question how "compassionate"
the act really is.
In considering the two-prong test as previously stated in Cali-
fornia Retail Liquor Dealers, it is clear that the Florida legislation has
119. Michelle Andrews, Advocates of Medical Marijuana Face Another Hurdle: Insur-
ance Coverage, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Nov. 19, 2012), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/
features/insuring-your-health/2012/112012-michelle-andrews-on-medical-marijuana.aspx;
see also Brian Montopoli, Will Health Coverage Pay for Medical Marijuana?, CBs NEWS (Oct.
20, 2009), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/will-health-coverage-pay-for-medical-marijuana/
(according to Susan Pisano of America's Health Insurance Plans and Bruce Mirken of the
Marijuana Policy Project, insurance companies, including Medicare and Medicaid, will not
cover medical marijuana until it has gone through the FDA drug approval process. This will
not happen because according to the federal government, marijuana is a Schedule I drug
with no accepted medical use.).
120. § 381.986.
121. California Retail Liquor Dealers Assoc., 445 U.S. at 106 (distinguishing this case
from Parker, stating that the state had extensive oversight over the prorate program and
noting that "[w]ithout such oversight, the result could have been different."); see also Gold-
farb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 780 (1975) (concluding that the fee schedules
enforced by a state bar association were not mandated by ethical standards established by
the State Supreme Court. The fee schedules therefore, were not immune from ethical anti-
trust attacks.).
122. Office of Economic & Demographic Research, Financial Impact Estimating Confer-
ence: Use of Marijuana for Certain Medical Conditions, FLA. DEP'T OF HEALTH, at 9 (Oct. 31,
2013), available at http://edr.state.fl.us/Content/constitutional-amendments/2014Ballot/Use
ofMarijuanaforCertainMedicalConditions/NotebookUpdates 11-4-13.pdf.
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met the first prong of the test. It is unclear, however, as to whether the
requirements of the second prong have been met. Failure of the Florida
legislation to pass the two-prong test would result in Florida's legisla-
tion, allowing only five dispensing centers to serve the entire state of
Florida, to be found invalid, under the Sherman Antitrust Act. Florida
legislation clearly states the purpose of having five dispensaries is to
allow for adequate access to medical marijuana by the consumer.
123
There are also very strict guidelines and monitoring programs that will
be set in place to prevent "diversion" or any other illegal activities asso-
ciated with marijuana sale.124 However, the state legislation fails to
put in place any regulatory or monitoring programs to ensure that the
five private individuals, with whom the state grants all of the author-
ity to cultivate, manufacture, and sell the medical marijuana for the
entire state of Florida, are not in violation of the Sherman Antitrust
Act. The Florida regulation, as it stands, provides for an environment
highly conducive to the creation of a monopoly.'
25
Assuming that the statute passes muster and receives immu-
nity protections as outlined in California Retail Liquor Dealers, the
U.S. Supreme Court has stated that, even if the state benefits from
antitrust immunity, "a state does not give immunity to those who vio-
late the Sherman Antitrust Act by authorizing them to violate it or, by
declaring that their action is lawful.'
26
123. FLA. STAT. § 381.986(5)(b) (2014).
124. Id. See also FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 64-4.005(1) (2015) (stating "[s]ubmission of
an application for Dispensing Organization approval or renewal constitutes permission for
entry by the department at any reasonable time during the approval or renewal process,
into any Dispensing Organization facility to inspect any portion of the facility; review the
records required pursuant to Section 381.986, F.S., or this chapter; and identify samples of
any low-THC cannabis or Derivative Product for laboratory analysis, the results of which
shall be forwarded to the department").
125. See Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 781-82 (stating "[a] title examination is indispensable in
the process of financing a real estate purchase, and since only an attorney licensed to prac-
tice in Virginia may legally examine title . . . consumers could not turn to alternative
sources for necessary service." The regulation in this case did not benefit from the Parker
"state action" exemption.).
126. Parker, 317 U.S. at 351 (referencing Northern Sec. Co. v. U.S, 193 U.S. 197, 332,
344 (1904) and Olson v. Smith, 195 U.S. 332, 344-45 (1904)) (concluding that "the state in
adopting and enforcing the prorate program made no contract or agreement and entered
into no conspiracy in restraint of trade or to establish monopoly, but as sovereign, imposed
the restraint as an act of government which the Sherman Act did not undertake to
prohibit.").
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B. The Sherman Antitrust Act's Applicability to Private Individuals
Section one of the Sherman Antitrust Act does not apply in this
situation, as there is no evidence of any "contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or com-
merce . "...,127 According to Ben Bolusky, CEO of Florida Nursery,
Growers and Landscape Association, who assisted the legislature in
creating the medical marijuana law, the reason his association pushed
for such a restrictive requirement was to "ensure Florida agriculture,
and especially nurseries that have greenhouse infrastructure, are not
left on the cutting floor.' 128 There does not appear to be any blatant
agreement between legislators, individuals, or corporations to enter
into an agreement o restrict competition. However, Section two of the
Sherman Antitrust Act could apply in this situation as there is a high
potential for the creation of a monopoly.
1. Swift & Co. v. U.S. Defines Monopoly
Section two of the Sherman Antitrust Act never defined what
constitutes a monopoly.'29 This leaves the door open for the courts to
define the term. In Swift & Co. v. U.S., the U.S. Supreme Court de-
fined a monopoly as:
Where acts are not sufficient in themselves to produce a result
which the law seeks to prevent, -for instance, the monopoly, -but
require further acts in addition to the mere forces of nature to bring
that result to pass, an intent to bring it to pass is necessary in order
to produce a dangerous probability that it will happen. But when
that intent and the consequent dangerous probability exist, this
statute, like many others, and like the common law in some cases,
directs itself against that dangerous probability as well as against
the completed result.'30
The Court has divided the monopoly offense in Section two of the Sher-
man Antitrust Act into "two elements: (1) the possession of monopoly
power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or mainte-
nance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a
127. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1890) [emphasis added].
128. Mary Wozniak, Florida Nurseries Seek Piece of Pot Pie, NEWS-PRESS (May 20,
2014), http://www.news-press.comlstory/news/2014/05/19/growing-medical-pot-picnic/9310
269/.
129. 15 U.S.C. § 2.
130. Swift & Co. v. U.S., 196 U.S. 375, 395-97 (1905) (using Commonwealth v. Peaslee,
177 Mass. 267, 272 (Mass. 1901)) [emphasis added].
\ \jciprod0 \productn\F\ FAM\ 10-1 \FAM105.txt unknown Seq: 22 17-DEC-15 12:55
130 FLORIDA A&M UNIV. LAW REVIEW Vol. 10:1:109
consequence of superior product, business acumen, or historic
accident."131
The Court surmised that pure competition exists where buyers
and sellers may "deal freely in a standardized product."'1 32 "A retail
seller may have in one sense a monopoly on certain trade because of
location, as an isolated country store or filling station, or because no
one else makes a product of just the quality or attractiveness of his
product . *..."133 A monopoly may exist in these situations, however,
these are not the types of monopolies that would be considered ille-
gal.'3 4 Illegal monopoly power exists where there is "the power to
control prices or exclude competition.' ' 35
"A monopolist willfully acquires or maintains monopoly power
when it competes on some basis other than merits."'36 The Court listed
three elements that may be used to prove attempted monopolization.
These include: "(1) that the defendant has engaged in predatory or
anti-competitive conduct with (2) a specific intent to monopolize and
(3) a dangerous probability of achieving monopoly power.'1 37 "In order
to determine whether there was a dangerous probability of monopoli-
zation, courts have found it necessary to consider the relevant market
and the defendant's ability to lessen or destroy competition in the
market." 38
2. Florida's Five Dispensing Organizations Violate the Sherman
Antitrust Act under the U.S. v. E.I. Du Ponte
Nemours & Co. Test
The first step in determining whether an illegal monopoly exists
is to define the relevant market. "Determination of the competitive
131. U.S. v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966) (referencing United States v.
E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956), in defining monopoly as "the
power to control prices or exclude competition." Such power "may be inferred from the pre-
dominant shares of the market.").
132. E.I du Pont, 351 U.S. at 392.
133. Id. at 392-93.
134. Id. at 393.
135. Id. at 391.
136. Race Tires Am., Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 614 F.3d 57, 75 (2010) (citing
LePage's Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 147 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc)).
137. Id. (citing Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 113 S. Ct. 884, 890-91 (1993)).
138. Spectrum Sports, Inc., 113 S. Ct. at 891 (referencing Arthur S. Langenderfer, Inc.
v. S.E. Johnson Co., 917 F.2d 1413, 1431-32 (6th Cir. 1990); Twin Labs., Inc. v. Weider
Health & Fitness, 900 F.2d 566, 570 (2d Cir. 1990); Colo. Interstate Gas Co. v. Natural Gas
Pipeline Co. of Am., 885 F.2d 683, 693 (10th Cir. 1989); Indiana Grocery, Inc. v. Super Valu
Stores, Inc., 864 F.2d 1409, 1413-16 (7th Cir. 1989); Gen. Indus. Corp. v. Hartz Mountain
Corp., 810 F.2d 795, 804 (8th Cir. 1987).
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market for commodities depends on how different from one another are
the offered commodities in character or in use, how far buyers will go
to substitute one commodity for another."'139 The more different the
commodity is, the less likely the commodity is to fall within the Sher-
man Antitrust Act.' 40 The definition the Court arrived at in defining
the relevant market is "commodities reasonably interchangeable by
consumers for the same purposes make up that part of the trade or
commerce."141
The relevant market in this case includes "[b]usinesses serving
Medical Use patients . . . [to] include companies that directly handle
legal marijuana, such as producers, processors, and distributors,''1 42
with only one dispensing center per region in Florida. "When a product
is controlled by one interest, without substitutes available in the mar-
ket, there is monopoly power."' 43
The next step in analyzing whether or not Section two of the
Sherman Antitrust Act has been violated is to see if there was "willful"
or "attempted" monopolization. According to the Court, "[a] monopolist
willfully acquires or maintains monopoly power when it competes on
some basis other than the merits."'1 44 The only relevant competition in
this case is being one of the first five applicants to obtain permission
from the Department of Health to become a dispensing organization.
Once that process is complete, no other growers of marijuana may
enter the market, except in the rare situation where a grower loses his/
her license. The growers will not have to compete based on the merits
of their business. Patients may either go to the grower in their region
to legally purchase marijuana or turn to the black market as an alter-
native source.
Florida legislation, in essence, forces a medical marijuana end-
user to purchase marijuana from only one supplier. Other competitors,
with potentially superior financial, business, and technical back-
grounds are excluded from entering the market to compete for the end-
user's business. However, courts have recognized that exclusive deal-
139. E.I. du Pont, 351 U.S. at 393.
140. Id. ("For example, one can think of building material as in commodity competition,
but one could hardly say that brick competed with steel or wood or cement or stone in the
meaning to Sherman litigation.").
141. Id. at 395.
142. ARCVIEw GROUP, THE STATE OF LEGAL MARIJUANA MARKETS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 5
(2d ed. 2014), available at http://investir.ch/devfinale/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/Executive
-Summary-The-State-of-Legal-Marijuana-Markets-2nd-Edition.pdf.
143. E.I. du Pont, 351 U.S. at 394.
144. Race Tires Am., Inc., 614 F.3d at 75.
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ings "generally pose little threat to competition.'145 They concluded
that "[exclusive dealing arrangements] may be highly efficient to as-
sure supply, price, stability, outlets, investment, best efforts or the
like."14
6
While the Florida legislation at hand does not deal with exclu-
sive dealing arrangements, the same principles may be applied. As
previously noted, marijuana is classified as a Schedule I drug, which
means that it may be highly addictive. 47 According to the Foundation
for a Drug-Free World, "[t]he vast majority of cocaine users (99.9%)
began by first using a "gateway drug" like marijuana, cigarettes or al-
cohol.' 48 By limiting the amount of individuals capable of cultivating
the plant, the state may better police the industry and limit abuse.
This will save the state money it would have otherwise spent on en-
forcement and monitoring. The savings the state incurs may be passed
on to the dispensing centers in the form of reduced application renewal
fees. The dispensing centers may then use the saved money to enhance
their facilities for better and more efficient production of the plant, re-
sulting in a higher yield and reduced cost to the consumer. In an ideal
world, this would be the case,'49 however, throughout history there
have been many instances where businesses have reduced production
or withheld goods to be sold in order to limit the supply and drive up
the cost of goods.'50
145. ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254, 270 (3d Cir. 2012).
146. On the Road to Drug Abuse, FOUNDATION FOR A DRUG-FREE WORLD, http://www
.drugfreeworld.org/drugfacts/marijuana/on-the-road-to-drug-abuses.html (last visited June
14, 2015).
147. The Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(c)(1) (1970).
148. Id.
149. When federal policymakers decide that they want to raise interest rates, they sell
government bonds. This sale reduces the price of bonds and raises the interest rate on these
bonds. (We can also think of this as the Fed reducing the money supply. This makes money
less plentiful and drives up the price of borrowing.). When policymakers decide they want to
lower interest rates, the Fed buys back government bonds. This purchase increases the
price of bonds and lowers the interest rate on these bonds. (We can think of this as the Fed
increasing the money supply, which makes money more plentiful and drives down the price
of borrowing.). See Alejandro Reuss, Why is the Government Buying Long-Term Bonds?,
DOLLARS & SENSE (2011), http://www.dollarsandsense.org/archives/2011/Olllreuss1.html;
see also Jerry Taylor & Peter Van Doren, Economic Amnesia: The Case Against Oil Price
Controls and Windfall Profit Taxes, CATO INSTITUTE (Jan. 12, 2006), available at http://ob
ject.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa561.pdf ("Empirical studies conclude that in the
short run, a 10 percent increase in gasoline prices will lead to a 0.6-1.0 percent decrease in
demand. In the long term, however, a 10 percent increase in gasoline prices will lead to a 10
percent decrease in demand.") (internal citation omitted).
150. See generally Price Elasticity of Demand, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia
.comterms/p/priceelasticity.asp (last visited June 14, 2015).
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Traditionally, economists believed that competition is greatest
when there are a large number of sellers of the same or similar prod-
ucts; however, the modern view is to look at the ability to freely enter a
market.'5 ' The freer market entry is, the less likely monopolistic be-
havior occurs, regardless of how large the business in an area gets.15
2
By restricting the ability to enter the market, Florida has basically left
it in the hands of five individuals to dictate the market. This hits at the
heart of the Sherman Antitrust Act. The consumer's ability to choose
the product, and where to purchase the product, rests not on the con-
sumer, but on the Department of Health's licensing decisions, leaving
"the consumer no input whatever.'15 3 It virtually eliminates competi-
tion, hurting a fragile subset of our community who has nowhere else
to turn for help, only to have the government create such a system to
further their injury.
5 4
IV. LEGAL REMEDIES FOR FLORIDA'S COMPASSIONATE MEDICAL
CANNABIS ACT'S HAZY FUTURE
A. Congress May Create a McCarran-Ferguson-Like Exemption
Logistically, a very simple solution to marijuana's legal woes
would be legalization at the federal level. A simple way to accomplish
this is for Congress to create an exception to the Controlled Substance
Act. Congress has passed legislation which allows for exceptions in the
past, such as in the passage of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.' 55 The Act
created an exception allowing for state regulation of health insurance.
The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in U.S. v. South-Eastern Underwriters
Association that Congress has the authority to regulate the health in-
surance industry under the authority given to it by the Commerce
151. N. GREGORY MANKIW, ESSENTIALS OF ECONOMICS 256 (7th ed. 2012).
152. See generally Nicholas Oxedine & Michael Ward, Price Effects from Retail Gasoline
Mergers (Apr. 2005) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). For a critique of SCP
modeling, see Harold Demsetz, Industry Structure, Market Rivalry, and Public Policy, 16 J.
L. & ECON. 1 (1973).
153. Santana Prods. Inc. v. Bobrick Washroom Equip., Inc., 401 F.3d 123, 133 (3d Cir.
2005).
154. Economic Department of Revenue, Financial Impact Estimating Conference, Use of
Marijuana for Certain Medical Conditions, FLA. DEP'T OF HEALTH (Oct. 13, 2013), available
at http://edr.state.fl.us/Content/constitutional-amendments/2014Ballot/UseofMarijuanafor
CertainMedicalConditions/NotebookUpdates 11-4-13.pdf (according to the Potential Range
of Sales Tax Revenues from Medical Marijuana End-Users chart created by the Department
of Health, a cancer patient could potentially spend in the upwards of $13,000 or more in
purchasing a year supply of medical marijuana. Most of these patients will not have insur-
ance to help cover any of the costs.).
155. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (2012).
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Clause of the U.S. Constitution.15 6 One year following the Court's rul-
ing in South-Eastern Underwriters Association Congress passed the
McCarran-Ferguson Act (MFA) of 1945, which provided the insurance
industry with a "limited exemption from federal antitrust laws.15 7 Spe-
cifically, the MFA exempts conduct that constitutes the business of
insurance to the extent that such conduct is regulated by state laws,
provided that it does not amount to an agreement o boycott, coerce, or
intimidate, or act of boycott, coercion, or intimidation.''15 This legisla-
tion essentially allows states to regulate the insurance industry within
their own borders in spite of the Commerce Clause.
The U.S. Supreme Court in Gonzalez v. Raich concluded that
Congress has the authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate
the production, manufacturing, and distribution of marijuana.15 9 The
Court further concluded that states are preempted in regulating medi-
cal marijuana. The Court in Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop.
specifically states that there is no medical necessity exemption under
the CSA and therefore, the state's medical marijuana legislation is pre-
empted. Logically, using the McCarran-Ferguson Act as a model,
Congress can simply enact legislation allowing states to regulate the
production, manufacturing, and distribution of medical marijuana,
thereby negating preemption. The "Respect States' and Citizens'
Rights Act of 2013,160 proposed by Diana DeGette of Colorado, has a
similar intent and effect, as its stated goal is to "provide that Federal
law shall not preempt State law."
B. The Federal Government May Reclassify or Declassify Marijuana
Under the Controlled Substances Act
Short of a complete, national embrace, the federal government
can simply reclassify marijuana as a Schedule II drug, or declassify
marijuana altogether. There are three ways to reclassify a drug under
the Controlled Substances Act. The first method is set out under 21
U.S.C. § 811(a), where the Attorney General, on his own motion, at the
156. 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
157. See generally State Insurance Regulation, NAT'L ASS'N OF INS. COMMISSIONERS,
http://www.naic.org/documents/topics white paper hist ins reg.pdf (last visited June 14,
2015).
158. Section for Antitrust Law, Comments to the Antitrust Modernization Commission
Regarding the McCarran-Ferguson Act, A.B.A. (Apr. 2006), http://www.americanbar.org/con
tent/danmaba/administrative/antitrust law/comments ame-mccarranferguson.authcheck
dam.pdf.
159. See generally 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
160. H.R. 964, 113th Cong. (2013).
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request of the Secretary of Health and Human Services, or upon the
petition of an interested party, may initiate proceedings for a hearing
to reclassify any drug on the Controlled Substance Act. 16 1 If an inter-
ested party is a party to the petition, it must first petition the DEA.
162
According to the court in NORML v. DEA, the DEA Administrator
must refer the petition to the Secretary of Health and Human Services
for scientific and medical evaluation.63 The DEA is required to hold a
public hearing where "all interested parties" are given an opportunity
to submit additional information for consideration by the agency.'
64 If
the Attorney General is initiating the proceedings, he must request
from the Secretary of Health and Human Services "a scientific and
medical evaluation, and his recommendations, as to whether such drug
or other substance should be controlled or removed as a controlled sub-
stance," prior to initiating proceedings.'
65
There are eight factors that the Secretary has to consider in
making his recommendations, which are then "binding on the Attorney
General.' 66 The Secretary of Health and Human Services can also
unilaterally make findings, based on medical and scientific evalua-
tions, to reclassify marijuana under the Controlled Substance Act. 167
As of this writing, the Secretary has refused, based on medical and
scientific evaluations, to reclassify marijuana. There is hope on the ho-
rizon for proponents of marijuana reclassification, however. In
testimony made to the House Committee on Oversight and Govern-
ment Reform, FDA Deputy Director Doug Throckmorton stated that
the FDA is currently conducting scientific and medical research on ma-
rijuana, as ordered by the DEA, in order to determine the appropriate
classification of marijuana.
6 s
The second way to reclassify marijuana is for Congress to take
action. Congress has, in the past, changed the classification of con-
trolled substances. For example, in 2000, Congress passed the "Hillory
J. Farias and Samantha Reid Date-Rape Drug Prohibition Act of
161. 21 U.S.C. § 811(a) (2014); 28 C.F.R. § 0.100 (2003) (delegating Attorney General's
authority to the Administrator of the DEA).
162. § 811(a).
163. 559 F.2d 735, 738 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
164. 5 U.S.C. § 554 (2014).
165. 21 U.S.C § 811(b) (2014).
166. Id.
167. See generally § 811.
168. Matt Ferner, FDA to Evaluate Marijuana for Potential Reclassification as Less
Dangerous Drug, HUFFINGTON POST (June 24, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.conm2014/
06/24/fda-marijuana n 5526634.html.
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2000."169 This Act amended the Controlled Substance Act to add
"gamma hydroxybutyric acid" to Schedule 1.170 On June 23, 2011, Sen-
ator Barney Frank of Massachusetts, along with several other
Senators, introduced a bill known as "Ending Federal Marijuana Pro-
hibition Act of 2011."'1' This bill was to completely remove marijuana
from the schedule under the Controlled Substance Act.' 72 The bill did
not get enough votes to pass both the House and Senate.73
Finally, the President may, by Executive Order, reclassify mari-
juana. President Obama may order the Attorney General to use the
power granted to the Attorney General under the Controlled Substance
Act. 174 In an interview with David Remnick, President Obama stated
that he did not think that marijuana was "more dangerous than alco-
hol."' 75 President Obama went on to say that he did not think it was
right that we are "locking up kids or individual users for long stretches
of jail time when some of the folks who are writing those laws have
probably done the same thing.' 76 President Obama feels that the le-
galization of marijuana in Colorado and Washington should go forward
because "it's important for society not to have a situation in which a
large portion of people have at one time or another broken the law and
only a select few get punished."'77 On February 12, 2014, in response
to President Obama's comments made during the interview, eighteen
members of congress wrote to the President requesting that he "in-
struct Attorney General Holder to delist or classify marijuana in a
more appropriate way .... ,7'1 The members of congress reasoned that
"[1]ives and resources are wasted enforcing harsh, unrealistic, and un-
fair marijuana laws ... [and that] [c]lassifying marijuana as Schedule
I at the federal level perpetuates an unjust and irrational system."'
1 79
President Obama has yet to act on Congress' recommendations; how-
169. Pub. L. No. 106-172.
170. Id. at § 2(4), 5(a), 114 Stat. 7, 7, 10.
171. H.R. 2306, 112th Cong. (2015).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. See 21 U.S.C. § 811.
175. David Remnick, Going the Distance: On and off the Road with Barack Obama, NEW




178. Letter from Earl Blumenauer et al., Congressmen, to Barack Obama, President
(Feb. 12, 2014), available at http://blumenauer.house.gov/images/stories/201402-12-14%20
Blumenauer%20Rescheduling%20Letter.pdf.
179. Id.
\ \jciprod0 \productn\F\ FAM\ 10-1 \FAM105.txt unknown Seq: 29 17-DEC-15 12:55
2014 MEDICAL MARIJUANA 137
ever, these actions seem to indicate a national trend in favor of
changing current marijuana laws.
Until marijuana becomes legalized nationally, either by re-
Scheduling or de-Scheduling the drug, states cannot truly create
meaningful marijuana legislation. This is the real crux of state mari-
juana laws. If federal legalization were to occur however, Florida's
legislation will still be pre-empted by the Sherman Antitrust Act. For a
state's legislation to be fully valid, and provide complete protection for
its citizens, it must pass legal muster on all fronts.
C. States Must Allow for Competition in the Medical Marijuana
Industry to Avoid Violating the Sherman Antitrust Act
The Sherman Antitrust Act was created to protect businesses
and consumers from legislation that would create a culture in which
businesses are allowed to create monopolies.
Monopoly is the extreme case in capitalism. It is characterized by a
lack of competition, which can mean higher prices and inferior
products. Competition is a regulating force, along with the self-in-
terest of the consumer8 0 in the U.S. economy. They work together
to keep prices low and bring new products to the market place; they
also foster innovations that help bring down the cost of doing
business."'1
The early history of the U.S. railroad industry is a resounding histori-
cal example of the economic perils inherent in a monopoly.
In the Nineteenth Century, there was a great Westward expan-
sion as entrepreneurs flocked to the West in hopes of making their
fortunes.8 2 Railroads were the main mode of transporting materials to
the West.8 3 As the railroad business boomed, large corporations "at-
tempted to stabilize their situations by pooling markets and
centralizing management" of other big businesses that relied on the
railroad industry such as "iron, steel, copper, glass, machine tools, and
oil."14 As a result of the consolidation of these big businesses, they
were able to eliminate competitors, drive down prices paid for labor
180. Andrew Beattie, A History of U.S. Monopolies, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investope
dia.com/articles/economics/08/hammer-antitrust.asp (last visited June 14, 2015).
181. History of Monopolies in the United States, ECONEDLINK, http://www.econedlink
.org/lessons/index.php?lid=628&type=educator (last visited June 14, 2015).
182. Rise of Monopolies: Development of the Railroad Monopoly, STANFORD COMPUTER
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and raw materials, charge customers more, and obtain special favors
from the government.'s5 "The actions of the railroad companies dic-
tated how nearly every citizen in the West (and a majority in the East)
performed their businesses and lived their lives. They were powerless
to avoid this conglomeration (or conspiracy) of individual
companies."1
6
Florida legislation, allowing only five dispensaries in the entire
state, threatens a repeat of the railroad monopoly. To prevent the crea-
tion of monopolies in what will potentially be a multi-billion dollar
business, Florida legislation must not impose measures that prohibit
businesses from entering the Florida marijuana market. As seen in the
railroad business, monopolies lead to higher costs to the consumer, less
efficiency, and potential for political corruption.
CONCLUSION
The Compassionate Medical Cannabis Act of 2014 is invalid
under the Sherman Act. By licensing five, and only five, marijuana dis-
pensaries, the state of Florida has created a monopoly. The intent of
this section of the Act is to create barriers to abuse. Having recently
emerged from its reputation as a pill mill state, the Florida legislature
has placed controls on the industry that, while formulated with good
intentions, place a choke-hold on free trade and gives five individual
businesses a ready-made market with no price ceiling. In this scenario,
being named a dispensary is akin to winning the lottery. Profits are all
but assured, with competition vanquished in advance. Price projections
have ranged from $225 to $450 dollars per ounce but are utterly mean-
ingless, as dispensaries will serve a hungry clientele that is without
choice. By eliminating competition and choice, Florida has left the com-
passion out of The Compassionate Medical Cannabis Act, and is
irrefutably in violation of the Sherman Antitrust act.
It is high time the federal government moved on marijuana.
Florida has become the twenty-third state to enact some form of mari-
juana legislation,8 7 highlighting the national trend. However, the
substance is still illegal. It is unconscionable that a law-abiding, state-
sanctioned business can be subject to prosecution by the federal gov-
ernment. Washington needs to officially recognize states' rights as
being preeminent in this regard, or make a move to either legalize or
decriminalize marijuana at the national level.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. FLA. MARIJUANA INFO., supra note 45.
